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Varieties of Capitalism and Banking in the EU 
 
Iain Hardie 
University of Edinburgh 
Introduction 
The title of this chapter might initially appear to suggest the covering of some relatively old 
academic ground. Banking, and in particular the ‘dichotomous framing’ of ‘bank-based’ and 
‘market-based’ financial systems (Clift, 2007; Culpepper, 2005), have long been at the heart 
of the distinctions underpinning the varieties of capitalism literature. The patience of banks 
in bank-based systems, encouraged by the long-term relationships they form with non-
financial companies (NFCs) shields NFCs from short-term market pressures. This allows, it is 
argued, long-term corporate investment decisions, worker involvement in company decision 
making, effective training schemes (apprenticeship programmes), and stable long-term 
employment relations, including worker retraining and cooperative wage bargaining. 
Essentially, strategies can be followed that yield delayed returns, rather than short-term 
profit maximization. In contrast, in ‘market-based’ systems, banks are not providers of long-
term capital and do not act as bulwarks against short-term financial market pressures on 
NFCs. Banks are predominantly short-term lenders and NFCs rely relatively more on equity 
and bond markets for finance.  
The patient capital banks provide in the bank-based (archetypally German) financial system 
comes in two forms: equity and debt. Banks are long-term holders of the equity of the NFCs 
with which they have relationships and on whose boards bank employees often sit. In truth, 
these bank shareholdings were already in decline at the time of Hall and Soskice’s seminal 
work (2001, p.23; Jackson and Moerke, 2005). NFC cross-shareholdings and/or long-term 
pension fund holdings (Culpepper, 2005) of NFC equity arguably continued to have an 
influence, but banks now have little remaining influence as providers of long-term equity 
capital in Europe. In countries, such as Germany, where bank executive membership of NFC 
boards has been a source of influence, such membership has also declined, albeit replaced 
by NFC insiders (Hackethal, Schmidt and Tyrell, 2006). 
The appropriate current focus for bank – NFC interaction is therefore bank lending. For 
Zysman (1983), there are two central distinctions between market-based and bank-based 
financial systems: first, between bank loans and securities; bank-based systems have 
persistently high aggregate bank lending in NFC finance (Beyer and Höpner, 2003; Vitols, 
2004; Deeg, 2010). Zysman (1983, p.63) makes the distinction between ‘the impersonal 
arm’s length dealings of capital markets’ and ‘the personal institutional ties of banks or 
lending institutions’. A second distinction, less commonly picked up by the subsequent 
literature, is between long and short-term bank lending. Patient banks in bank-based 
systems provide long-term loans. There are a number of assumptions implicit in Zysman’s 
typology, some largely unaddressed in subsequent literature, some now questionable in the 
context of developments in banking in recent years. The focus of this chapter is on the 
latter, and on three assumptions in particular. The first is that banks and banking are 
synonymous.  Zysman recognises the existence of non-bank lenders, but rightly, given their 
small size when he was writing, largely ignores them. Subsequent literature on VoC has 
almost entirely ignored non-bank lenders; over time, and highlighted most dramatically by 
the financial crisis, this has become less defensible.  
The second assumption is that loans are different from other types of financial instrument. 
‘What makes the financial systems different is the relative importance of two types of 
financial markets; capital markets and loan markets’ (Zysman, 1983, p.60). Borrowing 
through capital markets is to borrow in a way that exposes NFCs to the pressures of market 
prices, reducing their ability to make long-term decisions. The loan market, however, is in 
this typology different. Banks make loans, priced based on their own assessment of the 
creditworthiness of the borrower and of the long-term profitability of the relationship 
between bank and NFC. Not only are market pressures on NFCs mitigated by the ‘financial 
power‘ of the banks, but banks are willing to engage in ‘intertemporal transfers in loan 
pricing’ (Boot, 2000, p.13), lending at lower cost in the expectation of recompensing profit 
at a later date (Aoki, 1995; Aoki and Dinç, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Aoki, Patrick and 
Sheard, 1995; Deeg, 1998). This widespread distinction underpins the categorization of 
financial systems by considering the provision of capital to NFCs (loan, bond, or equity)1 or 
by the relative size of bank assets, equity stock market capitalization, and outstanding 
private bond market issuance (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000). Crucial to the absence of market 
pressures on NFCs is the fact that loans remain on bank balance sheets and are valued ‘at 
cost’ – with a value the same as when the loan was made – unless there is severe credit 
impairment. Loans, unlike securities, are not traded instruments, with their price moving up 
and down with financial market prices.  
This second assumption is concerned with the asset side of bank balance sheets and how 
market prices have an impact on those assets. The third assumption in Zysman’s framework 
refers to the other, liabilities, side of the balance sheet. This assumption underlies all 
assumptions regarding banks as providers of patient capital: that banks are able, not just 
willing, to perform that role. Since banks are leveraged financial institutions, their capacity 
to lend is dependent on their ability to borrow.2 In the early 1980s, when Zysman was 
writing, banks, even the investment banking operations of European universal banks, ‘draw 
their funds from [individual and NFC customer] deposits’, and depositors are loyal (Zysman, 
1983, p.61). These deposits could often be withdrawn on demand, but the overall volume 
was stable. Absent the rare event of a bank run, banks could be confident that they would 
have the deposits to fund long-term lending, despite the maturity mismatch. In the medium 
term, increased competition for deposits, and pressure from banks’ own shareholders, 
could bring market pressures on to the banks themselves, but at this time banks in CMEs 
have the capacity to be patient in their lending.  
This chapter explores these three core assumptions (the first briefly) in the context of 
developments in banking, particularly since the start of the century. The possibility of 
changes in banking has long been recognized in the VoC literature. Zysman encouraged 
future research into the impact of ‘ever more elaborate financial markets’ on national 
systems of capitalism (1983, p.281), and Hall and Soskice (albeit focusing narrowly on 
regulation rather than also on innovation in banking practices) observed that ‘[f]inancial 
                                                          
1 This ignores both the maturity of bank lending and financing from companies’ own retained 
earnings. See Murinde, Agung, and Mullineux, 2004. 
2 On the importance of long-term financing for the ability of German banks to make long-term loans 
to NFCs, see Vitols, 1998. 
deregulation could be the string that unravels coordinated market economies’ (2001, 64). 
These authors either recognized the static nature of their analysis (Zysman) or have been 
criticized for a lack of focus on processes of change (Hall and Soskice). Much of the VoC 
literature which followed them has indeed been centrally concerned with change, especially 
the extent of convergence between bank-based Continental European financial systems and 
their ‘Anglo-Saxon’ counterparts (see, for example, Berger and Dore, 1996; Crouch and 
Streeck, 1997; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Whitley, 1999; Schmidt, 2002). The question of change 
in Germany has figured particularly prominently. Yet throughout, this is a literature 
dominated by the issue of NFC financing: are NFCs increasingly reliant on securities markets 
for their financing, at the expense of bank loans? This literature suffers from two 
fundamental weaknesses (see Hardie et al., 2013; Hardie and Howarth, 2013a). First, and 
most important, it fails to question the fundamental dichotomy underpinning the VoC 
approach: the bank-based/market-based dichotomy. NFCs may (or may not – consensus has 
proved elusive) rely less on bank loans, but banks can still be patient and loans are different 
from securities. Related to this is a second weakness: a focus on the issue of convergence 
with an unchanging Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Change in the US and UK, the archetypal Anglo-
Saxon economies, is rarely considered (although see Howell, 2007).  
These weaknesses add up to a blind-spot regarding change in banks and banking. The view 
of banks has been very much within a narrative of disintermediation, of banks’ role in the 
financial system reducing as securities markets become more important. There has been 
consideration on the response of banks, but it is focused on their contribution to this 
disintermediation. One of the few CPE scholars writing on banks, Deeg (2010), highlights the 
rise in ‘deal-based banking’, and the ‘originate and distribute’ business model. Outside CPE, 
the approach has been similar. Lall (2006; see also Allen and Gale, 2000) discusses 
traditional and ‘new’ financial intermediation by non-banks. Erturk and Solari (2007) show 
change in the sources of bank profits, away from interest on loans towards fees.  
Such approaches are problematic for one simple reason. If this is the dominant issue of 
change with banks in recent years, the expectation must be that banks would become 
smaller, perhaps absolutely, but certainly relative to the size of developed world economies. 
An alternative measure would be a reduced role for bank lending in NFC financing. This is 
not what has happened. Figure 1 shows bank assets / GDP for selected EU countries since 
1980. Country experiences are not all the same, and there are some breaks in the data 
series. However, one thing is very clear. Banks have grown in size dramatically. The story of 
European banking since 1980, and especially since 2000, has not been about 
disintermediation. The importance of banks in the intermediation of financial flows in the 
European economy has dramatically increased, not declined. Prior to the financial crisis, the 
role of banks in NFC finance relative to securities markets similarly shows banks’ increasing 
importance, not decline (Hardie and Howarth, 2013b).  
Figure 1: Bank Assets to GDP, selected EU countries, 1980-2011  
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development Database 
One source of this increased size of bank balance sheets has been banks buying securities or 
‘trading assets’ (see below). Aglietta and Breton (2001, p.441) note that banks have added a 
‘new market portfolio’ to their ‘traditional credit portfolio’ (see also Hardie and Howarth, 
2009). Not only are banks making more loans to NFCs, but they are also becoming more 
important as the final purchasers of the securities whose development had been expected 
to result in banks’ disintermediation.  This would appear, on the surface, to suggest that EU 
economies (including the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ UK) were becoming more, not less, bank-based, as 
well as questioning the standard methodology of comparing the relative size of loan and 
securities markets. 
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This chapter does not, however, conclude that EU financial systems are becoming, more 
bank based. Rather, it questions these three assumptions underpinning the standard 
typology, as a way to consider present day financial systems and the role of banks within 
them. The next section examines the rise of banking activities performed by non-bank 
financial institutions: ‘shadow banking’. The subsequent section focuses on the asset side of 
banks’ balance sheets, and the extent to which they are subject to market forces, before a 
section focusing on the liability side of the balance sheet, and the changing nature of how 
banks finance not only their holdings of securities, but also their lending. This clear division 
of the two sides of the balance sheet is to some extent artificial (see discussion of the ‘repo’ 
market below), but serves a useful explanatory purpose. The aim of these two sections is to 
examine the ‘financial power’ of the banks (Zysman, 1983) through the concept of ‘market-
based banking’. Key to the conventional typology is banks having the power to act as 
bulwarks between financial markets and NFCs. This has spawned a considerable literature 
looking at the concentration of banks (though not banking) in individual countries, on the 
grounds that an oligopolistic market structure gives banks financial power (Byrne and Davis, 
2003; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Lall, 2006). I take a different view of financial power, 
arguing: 1) that changes in the loan markets have increasingly resulted in loans being the 
same as any other financial market instrument, actively traded and with the price 
determined in market trading; and 2) that lending is funded not only by patient depositors, 
but also be skittish financial market actors, whether other banks or NFCs making deposits or 
investors buying securities issued by the banks. The result is that the profitability of lending, 
and therefore its availability and pricing, is determined not by individual bank decision 
making  but by market prices. In traditional banking, banks make decisions on lending based 
on their own assessment of the correct terms for that loan and with little regard to 
pressures on their own borrowing; that borrowing being through stable customer deposits. 
Increasingly, both the terms of the loan and the cost of bank borrowing are directly 
determined by financial market prices. We have moved, to a varied extent across European 
national financial systems, to ‘market-based banking’ (Hardie and Howarth, 2013a; Hardie et 
al., 2013).  
Shadow banking 
The rise of shadow banking, in various guises, is one of the central explanations given for the 
financial crisis (e.g., Pozsar et al., 2009; Gorton, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2010). What 
these accounts highlight is the rise of credit provision by non-bank financial institutions, 
those entities rightly ignored by Zysman. In the crisis, the focus was on shadow banking in 
the US, but as regulators have increased the attention paid to this sector, the size of shadow 
banking in Europe has become apparent. As of end-2012, estimates from the Financial 
Stability Board (‘FSB’) put the assets of non-bank financial intermediaries in the euro area at 
31 percent of the total for the jurisdictions analyzed, compared to 37 percent for the US, 
with the UK a further 12 percent (FSB, 2013, p.10). Euro area assets were then US$22 
trillion, and more than half the size of those of banks. The FSB regards non-bank financial 
intermediation as a ‘conservative’3 initial proxy for shadow banking.   
There are nevertheless significant definitional uncertainties involved in any analysis of 
shadow banking. The term ‘shadow banking’ has been used to describe banking activity that 
is to a greater or lesser extent outside the commercial banking system (e.g., Pozsar et al., 
2009; Tucker, 2010). Of importance here is the distinction between those activities that are 
off balance sheet of the banks and those that are not directly connected to the banks. Some 
have seen these as best defined separately, as ‘shadow’ and ‘parallel’ banking respectively 
(Adrian and Shin, 2010; Hardie and Howarth, 2013b; Hardie et al., 2013), with the term 
‘market-based banking’ applied just to this shadow banking activity. Pozsar et al., (2009, 
p.66) similarly differentiate between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ shadow banking and adopt a 
very specific definition of parallel banking related to the distinction between regulatory 
arbitrage and genuine competitive advantage. Gorton and Metrick (2010; also Gorton, 
2010), in their focus on ‘securitized banking’, consider the funding of these securitized 
assets on the balance sheet, especially by the investment banks. However, shadow banking 
has been defined widely in recent debates, as policy makers seek to define banking and 
what should be regulated as a bank. The definition of shadow banking as ‘the system of 
credit intermediation that involves entities and activities fully or partially outside the regular 
banking system’ (FSB, 2013, p.5) must now be regarded as broadly accepted. An accepted 
                                                          
3 The FSB considers it currently covers around 90 percent of global financial system assets. Data 
focuses on country of domicile, and does not cover many of the offshore financial centres where 
much shadow banking activity is domiciled. This results in underestimation of hedge funds in 
particular (FSB, 2013, p.14). 
definition does not remove problems of analysis, however. Much of the activity of non-bank 
financial intermediation is not credit intermediation (for example, equity investment funds 
constitute 15 percent of all non-bank financial intermediaries). A more granular analysis by 
the FSB of 20 jurisdictions suggests that less than two-thirds of non-bank financial 
intermediation can be considered shadow banking. This may change as data improves.  
What is of interest to the VoC literature, and useful for cross-national comparison, may also 
remain somewhat at odds with the regulatory interest in the broadest data collection 
possible. For example, 5 percent of all non-bank financial intermediation in the FSB data, by 
volume, is by Dutch special financial institutions, and these entities represent around two-
thirds of non-bank financial intermediation in the Netherlands. The FSB describes these 
entities as ‘typically owned by foreign multinationals who use these entities to attract 
external funding and facilitate intra-group transactions’ (2013, p.12). This is in the main 
multinationals issuing bonds through a Dutch subsidiary, guaranteed by the parent, and the 
motivation is generally avoiding withholding tax. While of interest to those focused on 
MNCs minimizing their tax bills, this does not represent any ‘new’ form of credit 
intermediation that would be of interest to analysis of financial system change. Such 
activity, however, results in the Netherlands having by far the highest volume of non-bank 
financial intermediation relative to GDP of the jurisdictions in the FSB data, in addition to 
representing over 15 percent of all such intermediation in the euroarea (intermediation 
which, as a result, is larger relative to GDP than in the US).  
It is necessary, therefore, to be cautious in what we take from the recent work on shadow 
banking for considerations of VoC, and in particular regarding cross-national variation. We 
can say with confidence that non-bank credit provision increased rapidly in the years 
immediately preceding the financial crisis and that it has only reduced marginally since then. 
This is market-based financing of (amongst others) NFCs, and represents therefore secular 
change in the nature of NFC financing. It is change in EU financial systems as well as in the 
United States. We are as yet limited in the conclusions that can be drawn regarding intra-EU 
national variation, but the data available4 is generally supportive of existing views of 
financial systems, with the possible exception (largely for the reasons noted above) of the 
                                                          
4 For the UK, Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland.  
Netherlands. Non-bank financial intermediation is far greater, relative to GDP, in the 
Netherlands and UK (all over twice GDP) than in France, Germany, Spain and Italy (all under 
half of GDP). This is entirely as we would expect, given the overlap between the volume of 
non-bank financial intermediation and the size of equity and bond markets in any individual 
country. Moreover, there appears little reason to expect – based on currently available data 
– any change in financial systems’ relative positions (again, with the possible exception of 
the Netherlands) as a result of improvements in data allowing a focus on shadow banking 
that is more directly relevant to comparative political economy. 
A focus solely on even the narrowest areas of shadow banking, however, obscures as much 
as it reveals. It reveals one aspect of change while obscuring another, and for the EU in 
particular more important, development in financial systems: changes in the business 
activities of the banks themselves. Despite the very significant increase in the size of non-
bank financial intermediation, it remains less than half the size of bank financial 
intermediation (end-2012; FSB, 2013, p.8), with shadow banking even smaller. Confining the 
definition of market-based banking to shadow banking largely ignores the question of 
market-based banks. Changes in bank activities represent a potentially more important 
source of systemic change in financial systems. Those changes, and the rise of market-based 
banks as the central part of the rise of market-based banking, are therefore the main focus 
of this chapter, beginning with the next section’s focus on bank assets. 
The changing nature of bank assets 
Albeit with considerable simplification, we can focus on two parts of the asset side of bank 
balance sheets: bank holdings of securities and bank loans. The argument for market-based 
banking depends on change in these three areas, evidenced by: 1) Increased bank trading 
assets as a percentage of total assets; and 2) the changing nature of loan markets 
undermining their uniqueness amongst financial instruments.5  
                                                          
5 Hardie et al. (2013) and Hardie and Howarth (2013b) focus also on banks’ off balance sheet 
activities, especially Asset-Backed Commercial Paper. This market has collapsed, and much off 
balance sheet activity has moved back on bank balance sheets. Depending on regulatory 
developments, off balance sheet activities may once again become a key component of market-
based banks.  
The increase in financial assets    
Increased financial assets – with their prices and therefore profitability determined by 
financial markets – represent a change in bank activities that has been acknowledged in the 
existing literature on financial system change, most notably in Aglietta and Breton’s 
distinction between banks’ ‘new market portfolio’ and ‘traditional credit portfolio’ (2001, 
441). The innovation in this development should not be exaggerated: European universal 
banks have long held securities on their balance sheets (including bank holdings of NFC 
equity which are central to CMEs). The change is rather the significant recent increases in 
this ‘market portfolio’ and the resultant fall in loans as a proportion of bank balance sheets. 
These increases show the extent to which banks, on the asset side, have moved away from 
the view that dominates the VoC literature. Simplicity, and some data limitations, suggests 
measuring both loans and advances, and holdings of financial assets that are sensitive to 
market movements,6 as a percentage of total assets, as in figures 2 and 3: 
Figure 2 
Loans and Advances as % of Bank Assets, Selected EU Countries, 2008-2012. 
                                                          
6 Financial assets held for trading, financial assets designated at fair value through the profit and loss 
account, and available-for-sale financial assets. This excludes financial assets designated as held to 
maturity, and therefore valued at the purchase cost. 
 Source: ECB7 
Hardie and Howarth (2009, 2013b) and Hardie et al. (2013) show that loans became a 
reduced part of commercial bank activities before the financial crisis, particularly from 
around 2000. An important question is whether the change represents a secular change in 
the nature of banks, or was rather the product of a particular period of market excess. It 
remains far too early to answer that question definitively, given many unresolved problems 
in European banking, enforced government ownership and incomplete regulatory response. 
Figure 2, however, does not point to any dramatic reversal of the previous trend. Loans and 
advances are a marginally higher proportion of bank balance sheets in 2012 compared to 
2008 in four of the countries shown, but the most marked changes have been in Spain and 
the UK, where the proportion of loans and advances to total assets has fallen, in the UK very 
significantly. There is also little sign of any convergence across the countries.  
Figure 3 
                                                          
7 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/consolidated/html/index.en.html, accessed 13 July 2014. 
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Holding of Financial Assets as % of Total Bank Assets, Selected EU Countries, 2008-2012. 
 
Source: ECB 
Figure 3 confirms this situation of little material change since the financial crisis, in the 
holding of financial assets. This includes financial assets held on banks’ trading books, in 
addition to those deemed ‘available for sale’. The differences between these accounting 
treatments are not a focus here (see Ryan, 2008; Hardie, 2011, pp.48-50), but these are 
assets whose price movements will have a direct impact of bank profitability or equity. They 
can therefore be directly contrasted with the implied conception in the existing literature of 
bank assets as held ‘at cost’, with their profitability determined only by the quality of banks’ 
initial decision making regarding the creditworthiness of a borrower. 
Any conclusions regarding secular change must also be regarded as premature with regards 
to this ‘new market portfolio’ (Aglietta and Breton, 2001), in particular because of the 
regulatory response to the financial crisis. This response has included various plans, at EU 
and national level, for ‘ringfencing’ commercial from investment banking in the EU, with 
only the former likely to receive government support. Such regulation is clearly intended to 
reduce the holding of financial assets, but there is likely sign in figure 3 of this change taking 
place yet. Even focusing narrowly on assets held on trading books, in 2012 these were more 
than a quarter of total bank assets in the three largest European economies, France, 
Germany and the UK (including in the UK, loans valued at market prices). Indeed, as 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium
Germany
Spain
France
Italy
Netherlands
UK
Howarth and Quaglia (2014) have argued, the nature of bank balance sheets may well, 
through their influence on national positions on bank regulation, have a significant influence 
on the limits EU regulation places on bank involvement in the buying and trading of financial 
assets (also Hardie and Macartney, forthcoming).  
The changing nature of loan markets 
Thus far, the discussion of the changing nature of bank assets has implicitly maintained 
Zysman’s assumption that loans are a different kind of financial instrument. Hence, we can 
distinguish financial markets by the relative importance of loan and capital markets 
(Zysman, 1983, p.60). Such a distinction no longer holds. NFC loans are increasingly traded 
financial instruments like any other, either directly or via securitizations such as 
Collateralized Loan Obligations and Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities. As these loan 
markets become market based, this alternative source of market pressures potentially 
challenges a view that change has occurred only at the level of large firms, through 
increased issuance of equity and bonds, but not at Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) (on Germany, see Vitols, 2004). Loan trading is most active in the United States; 
Gorton (2010, p.42) sees the ratio of secondary market loan sales to outstanding 
commercial and industrial loans peaking in 2007 at over 25 percent. Although ‘relatively 
nascent’ (Standard & Poor’s 2010, 17), European markets had trading volumes in 2007 of 
US$225 billion (Axa Investment Managers, undated). The comparative importance of 
securitization between the US and Europe is similar. Although the US securitization market 
is far greater, European securitization reached US$453 billion equivalent by the crisis 
(European Securitisation Forum, 2008; see also ECB, 2009, p.10), and both the Bank of 
England and the European Central Bank have joined the Federal Reserve in supporting 
securitization markets post-crisis, seeing such support as vital to improving the ability of 
NFCs to borrow (Cheun, von Köppen-Mertes, and Weller, 2009; on the link between 
securitization and credit growth, see Jiangli and Pisker, 2008; Sabry and Okongwu, 2009). 
Securitization is central to a decline in banks’ financial power to limit the impact of the 
market on their clients (see Rajan and Zingales, 2003, p.8). In securitization, not only is the 
pricing and availability of financing determined by the market, but the ability of banks to 
coordinate the rescue of companies in difficulty (Zysman, 1983, p.64) is further undermined. 
The increasing use of Credit Default Swaps to trade and hedge corporate credit risk has 
contributed further to the extent to which the profitability of NFC lending, and therefore the 
decision on whether to lend and the interest rate to charge, has become determined not by 
bank decision-making but by market prices. When banks are ‘originating to distribute’ – 
making loans in anticipation of selling them via securitization, the pricing of the loan is 
determined by the anticipated price for which it can be subsequently sold. The availability of 
loans to NFCs therefore becomes set by the price at which they will be bought by financial 
market actors other than banks, or at which banks packaging them into securitization 
products will buy them. Market prices increase/decrease profitability, increasing/decreasing 
the ability to retain earnings to increase capital (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009, p.60), and, 
through the impact of profitability on bank share prices, increasing/decreasing the ability to 
raise new capital. Through ‘value at risk’ valuation of marked to market assets, increased 
volatility also increases the amount of capital banks require (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009, 
p.50; Commission Bancaire, 2009, p.23). The issue, however, is not solely one of losses but is 
also a matter of  procyclicality, as higher market prices can also increase profitability and 
lending capacity (Hellwig, 2009, p.180; IMF, 2008). 
The question of cyclical versus secular change is also important with respect to these 
developments. The picture is mixed. Securitization markets have seen major falls in volume, 
especially in Europe (excluding securitization to provide collateral for borrowing from the 
ECB) and some more esoteric financial products seem unlikely to return in anything like 
their previous form. The importance central banks attach to restarting certain forms of 
securitization, however, strongly suggests that this form of market-based lending will 
continue to be important. In the direct trading of loans, meanwhile, there have been a 
number of important developments. European secondary market trading volumes are down 
significantly, with quarterly volumes by the end of 2012 recovering to only a third of their 
2007 peak, according to one market estimate (Markit, 2013). Such a significant fall – to 
volumes which represent a tiny fraction of NFC lending in Europe – obscures some 
significant developments which point also to significant secular change. 
First, the trading of loans is no longer confined to ‘leveraged’ or non-investment grade 
loans. The initial development of this market, in both the US and Europe, was very much 
focused on this section of NFCs. However, as of the last quarter of 2012, the rapidly 
expanding trading of investment grade loans made up 21 percent of European loan trading 
(Markit, 2013), suggesting a fuller range of NFC loans are being traded. Second, and more 
significant, institutional investors have been moving into the gap created by banks’ 
difficulties, establishing loan funds to invest in loan markets. In 2012, banks only made up 
52 percent of the primary leveraged loan market in Europe (Forbes, 21 January 2014).With 
many of these loans not being traded (but still priced at market-driven yields), these 
developments will not show fully in data on secondary market trading.8 Third, the regulatory 
attempts to move CDS trading onto exchanges will be likely to increase the visibility of these 
derivatives as the benchmark for pricing NFC credit in both bond and loan markets, thereby 
increasing the market element in loan pricing.   
Changes in the securitization and trading of loans in Europe are not as yet at the levels of 
the United States, even in the United Kingdom, and there has been a significant reduction in 
this activity since the financial crisis. Nevertheless, even at the current levels, it is clear that 
these developments undermine the stark distinction between loans and securities markets. 
It is possible to distinguish financial systems by the extent to which these changes have 
occurred, but it is no longer possible to justify the (empirically simpler) typology using the 
comparative size of loan and securities markets.   
The Changing Nature of Bank Liabilities 
Changes in banks are not confined to just one side of their balance sheets. Market-based 
banking can be seen also in bank liabilities, and in particular in the way customer deposits 
have become a smaller component of bank borrowing. A ‘traditional’ bank borrows the 
money it lends from its customers through their deposits. Any holdings of securities are 
similarly financed by deposits (Zysman, 1983, p.61). These depositors, even if their deposits 
can be withdrawn at any time, tend to be themselves patient. A bank run is possible, but, 
until Northern Rock in the UK in 2008, there had not been such a run in the UK since the 
nineteenth century. Furthermore, government guarantees to smaller depositors quickly 
returned depositors to their previous patience. As a result, banks funded by deposits do not 
face market pressures from this source to reduce lending or increase its cost (although note 
                                                          
8 Post-crisis, trading volumes in most financial instruments have fallen, as banks have been less 
willing to support secondary trading. Secondary loan trading volume needs to be viewed in this 
context. 
the role of increased competition discussed above). In contrast, banks financed through 
financial markets, including, importantly, from other banks,9 face the possibility that these 
‘skittish’ investors can withdraw almost instantly (see, for example, Basel Committee of 
Banking Supervision, 2008, p.2). At the extreme, such as Northern Rock, this is the initial 
source of problems which lead to collapse. 
The liability side of the balance sheet has moved far from the traditional conception of bank 
lending funded by customer deposits. First, as discussed by Gorton and Metrick (2010; also 
Gorton, 2009) in the case of ‘securitized banking’, holdings of financial assets are financed on 
a very short-term secured basis in the repurchase, or ‘repo’ market. The problems in this 
market have been well documented elsewhere in the case of the US, but were also significant 
in Europe. By August 2008, outstanding euro area repos totaled €6 trillion, 70 percent of GDP 
(Gabor, 2012, p.17). The market sensitivity and procyclicality of market-based assets are 
compounded when these assets are financed, as the vast majority are, by borrowing on a very 
short-term basis collateralised by the assets themselves. This is particularly the case in 
shadow banking by the investment banks. The importance of the repo market is highlighted 
by the analysis of the crisis in the US as a ‘run on repo’ (Gorton and Metrick, 2010; see also 
Acharya et al., 2010). The focus of these studies on the repo market serves to highlight that 
market-based assets are most commonly financed with market-based liabilities, and further 
shows the difficulties of seeking to disentangle the two sides of bank balance sheets. Although 
the securities financed in the European repo market include many unrelated to NFC lending 
(especially government securities), bonds issued by NFCs are also significant (Gabor, 2012, 
p.19).  
The second important area of market-based bank liabilities is in the financing of their 
customer lending activity. Very few banks have customer deposits equal to, or in excess of, 
their customer loans, creating a customer funding gap which can only be financed by 
borrowing from market sources (Bank of England, 2009, p.37; ECB, 2009, p.9; Raddatz, 2010). 
Financial market conditions have a direct impact on lending as a result. Kroszner, Laeven, and 
Klingebiel (2007) show how credit-dependent sectors grow faster in normal times and are hit 
harder in tough times, while Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2009; see also Basel Committee on 
                                                          
9 Byrne and Davis, 2003, p.156, show the increasing importance of interbank lending from 1970 to 
2000. 
Banking Supervision, 2008, p.11) show that banks with higher customer deposits (and 
therefore less market based) reduced lending less during the financial crisis. Figure 4 sets out 
the size of that customer funding gap as a percentage of total bank assets, across the 
countries considered in this chapter: 
Figure 4: Customer Funding Gap,10 selected EU countries, 2008-2012. 
  
   Source: ECB 
These developments can also be placed in a longer term context: from 1980 to 2000, deposits 
represented a declining share of bank liabilities in G7 countries except Japan (unchanged) and 
France (Byrne and Davis, 2003, p.159),11 and this continued until the financial crisis (Hardie 
and Howarth, 2013b). In order to lend, banks have always needed to borrow; 12 at issue is the 
nature of that borrowing. To varying degrees across the countries considered here, by the 
financial crisis a large proportion of that borrowing was not from deposits, but through 
sources such as the interbank market (short-term borrowing from other banks), bonds issues 
or securitization. As a result, banks’ ability to lend is heavily influenced by their own market 
access, limiting the ‘financial power’ that can shield NFCs from market pressures. This 
development is recognized in central bank surveys of lending conditions for NFCs: EU banks 
                                                          
10 Calculated as total loans and advances less total deposits other than those from credit institutions, 
all banks.   
11 Increasing interbank deposits means customer deposits declined even more (Byrne and Davis, 
2003, p.155). 
12 Including borrowing from the central bank, involving liquidity support in a crisis. 
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are now asked about ‘the cost and availability of [their own] funding’ as an influence on 
lending to NFCs. This is a question the traditional conception of banks could not envisage 
being asked. 
The customer funding gap for banks in the countries considered here increased in the years 
before the financial crisis, with the exception of Germany (Hardie and Howarth, 2013b; Hardie 
et al., 2013). As a result, market forces became more influential on lending. Figure 4 shows 
that the situation post-crisis is slightly more mixed. The funding gap has fallen, 2008-2012, in 
five of the seven countries, most dramatically in the UK. Overall, this is a clear reversal of the 
previous trend. However, it is only (with the exception of the UK) a partial reversal. Financial 
market financing of NFC lending remains substantial in Europe, including in countries 
generally seen as bank-based.  
The caveat regarding premature conclusions regarding post-crisis banks applies in this area 
also. Some contraction of market financing of lending after 2008 was to be expected, but the 
situation when European banks finally overcome their problems remains highly uncertain. 
However, even if banks did shrink their lending sufficiently for customer loans to be anything 
like equal to customer deposits, the result could only be even greater increases in the size of 
shadow banking, and therefore continued growth of market-based banking. Anyway, the 
change in banking practices would be too great. When the funding gap on loans and the 
financing of securities is combined, the IMF (2010, p.67) estimates UK banks total market 
financing at over $4 trillion (146 per cent of GDP) by end 2007. Separate country figures for 
the Euro area are not given, but the Euro area total is US$12.4 billion (94 percent of Euro area 
GDP). Short-term (up to 1 year) bank market funding, the most immediate source of market 
pressure on bank lending, represented 65 per cent of UK GDP  and 54 per cent of the Euro 
area (IMF, 2010, p.67; in comparison, the US figure is ‘only’ 32 percent). 
Any full analysis of the market pressures on banks as a result of financial market funding 
requires a more detailed consideration of the various sources of that funding. This is also 
necessary for any sensible comparison across countries. Empirically, this is challenging, as it 
involves an understanding of very similar markets in different countries. Both Italian and 
German banks, for example, rely relatively heavily on issuing unsecured bonds as a means of 
funding. In both cases, however, the nature of the purchasers of those bonds – the banks’ 
own individual or savings bank customers – makes this a more stable source of borrowing 
than bonds sold to a broad range of institutional investors (e.g., Westdeutsche Landesbank, 
2009, p.97; Bayerische Landesbank, 2009, p.33; Pagoulatos and Quaglia, 2013, p.186). 
Similarly, banks in a number of countries issue covered bonds, a particular form of secured 
bond.13 However, this market is longer-established and more stable in Germany (Pfandbriefe) 
than in other countries. A state guarantee on mortgages also makes Dutch securitizations 
more stable (Chang and Jones, 2013, p.83). Any fuller attempt to outline these distinctions is 
beyond the scope of this chapter (for further discussion, see Hardie and Howarth, 2013a; 
Hardie et al., 2013). The bank funding markets can however, as an initial analysis, be 
distinguished in three ways. First, by the maturity of borrowing; shorter maturity liabilities, 
including borrowing from other banks, transmit market problems to banks’ financing more 
quickly. The majority of unsecured interbank borrowing is short term, often for less than a 
week (Bank of England, 2007, p.34). Banks reliant on longer-term sources of funding (for 
example, Germany), such as various forms of bonds, face less immediate refinancing 
pressures. Second, wholesale markets must be distinguished by their fragility: the financial 
crisis has demonstrated that some wholesale markets are more fragile than others (Hardie, 
et al., 2013; ECB, 2009, p.11), making the impact on lending of market difficulties more 
immediate for those systems more dependent on those markets. Third (and empirically most 
difficult), market borrowing can be distinguished by who is being borrowed from – by the type 
of investor. Individual investors buying bonds may be largely indistinguishable in their 
behaviour from individual depositors. Borrowing from other banks has proved especially 
skittish, with borrowing from international banks and especially in foreign currencies 
particularly vulnerable in the event of market weakness. Institutional investors are also 
generally likely to exit. Overall, however, it must be recognized that exposure to financial 
market funding generally goes hand-in-hand with financing from less stable sources. 
The Implications of Market-Based Banking for Varieties of Capitalism 
This chapter has argued that the nature of banks and banking has undergone such profound 
change that the underpinning of the bank-based/market-based dichotomy has disappeared. 
Although there is no simple correspondence between typologies of financial systems and 
                                                          
13 For further detail, see IMF, 2009, p.90. 
modes of capitalism (Deeg, 2010), this clearly has significant implications for the varieties of 
capitalism literature. As noted above, Hall and Soskice (2001) already saw the potential for 
change in banks to undermine CMEs, which depend on bank-based finance. If banks are just 
another group of financial market actors, as influenced by market prices as any others, it 
might appear sensible to consider an end to the long-running debates on convergence of 
CMEs with the LMEs. For VoC, if such a view is accepted, either a financial system 
underpinning of CMEs was always incorrect, or much of the VoC literature is in danger of 
finding itself in a cul de sac.  
That is not the view taken in this chapter, for two reasons. First, considerable national 
variation in market-based banking remains, as the data presented above clearly show. In a 
number of the European countries discussed here, a significant amount of ‘traditional’ 
banking – loans to NFCs which remain on the banks’ balance sheets, funded by customer 
deposits – remains. The extent of market-based banking is in itself a source of national 
variation. The post-crisis regulatory response could be as likely to heighten this variation as 
reduce it, though that must remain supposition at the time of writing (November 2015).  
In terms of the direction of research, central bank desires to support securitization and the 
FSB’s focus on a future for ‘market-based finance’ (Carney, FT.com, 16 June 2014) may point 
in another direction. While closer attention to the nature of banking in developed 
economies is overdue for comparative political economy, a research agenda considering the 
extent of national system moves from traditional to market-based banking should not be 
the main focus of future research on financial systems. A further, more promising, approach 
involves abandoning the existing dichotomy, and questioning the homogeneity not only of 
bank-based finance, but also of market-based. The underlying logic of patient capital 
protecting NFCs from short-term market pressures is maintained, but the assumption of 
banks as necessarily the only, or even the predominant, source of patient capital is 
abandoned. CPE has made small steps in that direction already: NFCs’ long-term holding of 
each other’s equity, for example, has long been central to financial systems in certain CMEs, 
and pension funds have been seen as a potential replacement for banks as patient owners 
of NFC equity (e.g., Culpepper, 2005). There is much further to go, with a research agenda 
targeted across the range of financial market providers of capital to NFCs. Such an agenda 
would require fundamental questioning of a number of the basic assumptions in the VoC 
literature. For example, does patient capital require a relationship between NFC and the 
provider of capital? What is the nature of market pressures on lenders? What is the role of 
voice versus exit? The list of potential questions is long, and the implications of the answers 
may well lead CPE to a very different conception of the varieties of financial systems.  
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